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Abstract
Experiments involving delayed-choice entanglement swapping seem to suggest
that particles can become entangled after they’ve already been detected. This
astonishing result is taken by some to undermine realism about entanglement. In
this paper, I argue that one can offer a fully realist explanation of delayed-choice
entanglement swapping by countenancing timelike entanglement relations. I ar-
gue that such an explanation—radical though it may be—isn’t incoherent and
doesn’t invite paradox. I compare this approach to the antirealist alternative
and a more deflationary realist strategy defended by Egg (2013), each of which
face certain challenges. The upshot is that we should take seriously the possi-
bility of timelike entanglement and seek to develop a framework for quantum
theory which allows for it.
1. The Puzzle: Delayed-Choice Entanglement Swapping
Entanglement swapping is a procedure in which entanglement may be “swapped”
from a pair of jointly measured particles to a pair of particles lacking common
prepartion. The technique has become quite commonplace in experiments in-
volving entanglement and has numerous applications in quantum information
theory (Bouwmeester et al., 2000). A simple experimental arrangement is de-
picted below (figure 1). Consider two sources that each produce a pair of photons
in the state |ψ−〉 = 1√2 (|HV 〉− |V H〉). One source produces the entangled pair
(1,2) and the other produces (3,4). Initially, the quantum state of the four-
particle system is simply the product of two pair states |Ψ〉 = |ψ−〉12 ⊗ |ψ−〉34.
This state is separable into the states |ψ−〉12 and |ψ−〉34, each of which is an
entangled two-photon state. Accordingly, there are two distinct entanglement
relations—R12 and R34—but no such relations between the pairs or between
photons from different pairs.
The outer particles are sent off to polarization detectors at Alice and Bob
while the inner particles are sent to a common location, Victor, which contains
a switchable Bell-state analyzer. When switched on, a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) is performed, which has the effect of projecting the incident particles
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Figure 1: Entanglement Swapping Configuration
into one of the four maximally-entangled Bell-states:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉|V 〉 ± |V 〉|H〉], |φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉|H〉 ± |V 〉|V 〉]. (1)
Otherwise, a separable state measurement (SSM) is performed. If the analyzer
is off and the particles are measured separately, then, as expected, Bell-type
correlations are found between the pairs (1,2) and (3,4) as in an ordinary EPR
experiment.
If the analyzer is on, however, particles 2 and 3 are projected into one of
the entangled Bell-states and, as a result, the remaining particles 1 and 4 are
projected into an entangled Bell-state as well. This can be seen by writing the
initial four-particle state in the basis given by the Bell-states of (2,3):
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
[|ψ+〉14|ψ+〉23 − |ψ−〉14|ψ−〉23 − |φ+〉14|φ+〉23 + |φ−〉14|φ−〉23]. (2)
Given this expression of |Ψ〉, we can see that if a BSM is performed at Victor
with a result of, say, |ψ+〉23, then the remaining particles are projected into the
state |ψ+〉14, and similarly for the other Bell states. Crucially, regardless of the
outcome of the BSM at Victor, photons 1 and 4 become entangled (and (1,2),
(3,4) become disentangled) as a result. Thus, we may say that entanglement
has been “swapped” from (2,3) to (1,4).1
1Taken at face value, this description assumes a collapse interpretation of quantum theory,
which many reject. However, one could recover a similar description on non-collapse inter-
pretations at the level of effective quantum states, i.e., one may suppose that Victor’s BSM
yields effective entanglement between (2,3) and suitably decoheres (1,2) and (3,4) so as to
render them effectively disentangled.
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Entanglement swapping has some important implications for the understand-
ing of entanglement. First, the particles that become entangled have never pre-
viously interacted, even in their preparation. This means that entanglement
cannot be understood as essentially the result of systems “[entering] into tem-
porary physical interaction due to known forces between them, and when after
a time of mutual influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer
be described in the same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with
a representative of its own” (Schro¨dinger, 1935). Second, if one thinks that
entanglement relations involve action at a distance, then action at a distance is
capable of influencing relational dispositions in addition to monadic ones (cf.,
Berkovitz (2016)). In particular, on such a view, extant entanglement relations
(between (1,2) and (3,4)) may be ultilized to create new entanglement relations
(between (1,4)). Yet, while the implications of entanglement swapping are sig-
nificant, few have taken the phenomenon to present a major threat to realism
about entanglement or the quantum state more generally.2
Delayed-choice entanglement swapping, by contrast, seems to present a real
puzzle for realist conceptions of entanglement. The procedure was proposed as a
thought experiment by Peres (2000), but has now been realized experimentally
by Ma et al. (2012) and others. We begin with two entangled systems as in
the ordinary case, but rather than have Victor preform his measurement prior
to Alice and Bob, we delay particles 2 and 3 so that Victor can perform his
measurement after his colleagues. Recall that the argument given above—the
transition of equation 2 to a state in which (2,3) and (1,4) are each in entangled
Bell states—didn’t specify any times. This suggests that we should expect
the same result as in the ordinary swapping case. In particular, when Victor
successfully performs a BSM, entanglement will be swapped to (1,4).
And, in fact, these results seem to have been confirmed by an experiment
conducted by Ma et al. (2012) depicted below (Figure 2). We begin as before:
two pairs of entangled photons (1,2) and (3,4) are produced by two EPR sources
in the state |ψ−〉12 ⊗ |ψ−〉34. At this point the photons 1 and 2 are mutually
entangled, as are 3 and 4, but the 4-particle state is separable, and hence there is
no entanglement across the two pairs. Alice and Bob each perform a polarization
measurement of their photons (1 and 4, respectively) along one of three freely-
chosen axes (|H〉/|V 〉, |R〉/|L〉, |+〉/|−〉) and the data from these measurements
are saved for later analysis. Particles 2 and 3, meanwhile, enter an optical delay
and only reach Victor at time MV , nearly 500ns after MA and MB , the times
at which Alice and Bob perform their measurements.
As before, Victor “chooses” between performing a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) or a separable state measurement (SSM) on (2,3). In the actual ex-
periment, the switchable Bell-state analyzer was linked to a quantum random
number generator which determined the measurement (BSM or SSM) to be
performed. The photons 2 and 3 are projected into either an entangled state
(|φ+〉23 or |φ−〉23) if a BSM is performed or a separable state in the case of a
2Seevinck (2006) is an exception, but see Timpson & Brown (2010) for a reply.
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Figure 2: Delayed-choice entanglement swapping arrangement
SSM. When Victor’s results are compared with those of Alice and Bob, they
are found to be consistent with ascribing an entangled state to photons 1 and
4 (|φ+〉14 or |φ−〉14) when a BSM is performed and a separable state otherwise.
Thus, it seems that entanglement has been swapped to particles (1,4) after they
have already been detected (at MV )!
This presents the following challenge: In the ordinary entanglement swapping
case, Victor has the power to entangle (or not) the outer particles (1,4) at a
distance. In the delayed-choice case, it seems that Victor has the same power
to entangle (1,4). However, at the time of Victor’s measurement (or choice),
(1,4) have already been detected. Thus, Victor’s measurement must not only
be capable of influence at a (spacelike) distance, but also backwards in time.
The only way Victor can entangle (1,4) is to act on them retrocausally when
(or before) they are measured (t ≤ MA,MB). Moreover, if Victor’s ability is
grounded in extant entanglement relations, it seems that these must be relations
of entanglement across time.3
2. Timelike Entanglement
Several authors have suggested that delayed-choice entanglement swapping
(DCES) undermines realism about entanglement. Here, for instance, is Peres’s
assessment in his original discussion of DCES:
3Writing in Aeon magazine, Elise Crull (2018) claims that a variant of the delayed-choice
entanglement swapping experiment performed by (Megidish et al., 2012) reveals “temporal
nonlocality,” which is closely related to timelike entanglement. I’ll have a bit more to say
about temporal nonlocality in section 6 below.
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...if we attempt to attribute an objective meaning to the quantum
state of a single system, curious paradoxes appear: quantum effects
mimic not only instantaneous action-at-a-distance but also, as seen
here, influence of future actions on past events, even after these
events have been irrevocably recorded. (Peres, 2000, 141)
Ma et al. draw a similar conclusion after arguing that their results support the
existence of DCES:
If one views the quantum state as a real physical object, one could
get the seemingly paradoxical situation that future actions appear as
having an influence on past and already irrevocably recorded events.
However, there is never a paradox if the quantum state is viewed as
to be no more than a “catalogue of our knowledge.” (Ma et al.,
2012, 483)
Finally, Richard Healey takes DCES to lend support to his pragmatist interpre-
tation of quantum theory by undermining entanglement realism:
The delayed-choice entanglement-swapping experiment reinforces the
lesson that quantum states are neither descriptions nor representa-
tions of physical reality. In particular, it undermines the idea that
ascribing an entangled state to quantum systems is a way of rep-
resenting some new, non-classical, physical relation between them.
(Healey, 2012, 31)
In section 3 below, I will consider the alternative, anti-realist account of
DCES these authors prefer. But, here I wish to claim that there is no obvious
paradox or contradiction in a fully realist interpretation of DCES. Moreover, by
positing timelike entanglement, one can provide the same form of explanation
in all instances of entanglement swapping.
To begin, recall the ordinary swapping case. The realist explanation of Bell-
type correlations between Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes follows from
these key claims:
1. Initially, there is entanglement between particles (1,2) and (3,4).
2. When Victor performs a BSM on particles (2,3), he thereby creates an
entanglement relation between them.
3. Victor’s measurement also has the effect of entangling particles (1,4).
4. The entanglement of (1,4) explains the violation of a Bell inequality in
Alice and Bob’s measurement results.
Note that (1) is what allows for the move from (2) to (3); the reason Victor can
entangle (1,4) remotely is because there is extant entanglement relating each of
them to particles 2 and 3, with which he can directly interact. In this way, en-
tanglement mediates the influence Victor is able to exert on (1,4). Then, once we
have an entanglement relation between (1,4), it may enter into our explanation
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of Bell-type correlations in the standard way; in some sense, the correlations in
measurement results are the effect of a physical entanglement relation between
the particles measured. The details of this explanation will depend on the par-
ticular interpretation of quantum theory in general (and quantum measurement
in particular) one favors.
What would this explanation look like applied to DCES? Exactly the same!
If Victor’s BSM on (2,3) is able to entangle (1,4), then there must be extant
entanglement relating (1,2) and (3,4). But, of course, (1,4) have already been
measured in an DCES experiment, so we must suppose that there are timelike
entanglement relations, namely, those between (a) particle 1 at t ≤ MA and
particle 2 at MV and (b) particle 3 at MV and particle 4 at t ≤ MB . If
we can make sense of such timelike entanglement relations, we can extend the
explanation of swapping to the case of DCES. 4
But is timelike entanglement a coherent notion? Or is there something about
the realist understanding of entanglement relations that prevents their extension
into the temporal dimension? Of course, it’s difficult to say anything signifi-
cant about nature of entanglement outside the context of a (particular version
of a) particular interpretation of quantum theory. For our purposes here, it
will suffice to consider two broad families of thinking about entanglement that
cross-cut interpretations qua solutions to the measurement problem. This tax-
onomy is not exhaustive, but captures a number of approaches to entanglement
in versions of (e.g.,) Bohmian mechanics, dynamical collapse theories, modal
interpretations, and “textbook” quantum mechanics. Thus, if both families are
consistent with timelike entanglement, that goes some way toward establishing
the conceptual coherence of the notion.
Action at a Distance (AAD): entangled particles are capable of unmedi-
ated non-local influence.
Non-separability (NS): entangled particles are fundamentally not wholly on-
tologically distinct.
There is much to be said about each strategy and how they relate to the
various realist interpretations (for a start, see Healey (2016); Berkovitz (2016).)
My claim is simply that on either understanding, timelike entanglement is novel,
but not inconsistent. This shows that, at least for advocates of either approach,
there is no paradox involved in the fully realist analysis of DCES suggested
above.
4What are the relata of such entanglement relations? Here I follow standard practice in
speaking of entanglement between particles, but more carefully, entanglement relations hold
between states of particles which are indexed to a particular time. Hence, in the ψ− state,
the polarization state of each particle is entangled. Timelike entanglement would retain these
time-indexed states as the relata of entanglement relations but allow that they be indexed
to different times. As discussed in section 5 below, this may require revising the standard
quantum mechanical formalism.
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2.1. Timelike AAD
Taken at face value, DCES seems to suggest retrocausation for the AAD
approach. Victor’s measurement seems to cause particles (1,4) to become en-
tangled at, or prior to, the time at which they are detected by Alice and Bob. If
this supposition is correct, and retrocausation itself is incoherent, then timelike
AAD does indeed lead to paradox in the case of DCES. However, there are good
reasons to reject each step of this argument.
First, the supposition that there is retrocausality involved may be resisted.
For instance, one may claim that the earlier entanglement of (1,4) at MA,MB
causes Victor’s choice to perform a BSM at MV . This would seem to have prob-
lematic implications for Victor’s free will—suggesting that his choice to perform
a BSM wasn’t truly free—but such considerations aren’t necessary decisive.5
After all, as noted by Evans et al. (2012, 317), the popular “block universe”
understanding of time has it that there are facts about the future actions of
apparently free agents. Of course, whether the block universe is compatible
with free will is a controversial matter, but the point is simply that one doesn’t
dismiss special relativity on the grounds that it rules out genuine free will. Sim-
ilarly, the suggestion that Alice and Bob’s measurements fix a fact about the
future choice of a free agent doesn’t amount to an obvious contradiction.
A quite different way to reject retrocausality is to deny that the AAD in-
volved in entanglement is causal. There is a long history of attempts to reconcile
AAD with special relativity that seek to diminish the causality of the influence
in question. In this context, Abner Shimony coined the memorable phrase “pas-
sion at a distance” for a non-causal influence involved in quantum non-locality.
Moreover, the no-signalling theorems of (e.g.,) Ghirardi et al. (1980); Jordan
(1983); Redhead (1987) establish that no local measurement will allow for su-
perluminal communication via a shared pair of entangled particles. This might
further motivate the sense that the superluminal influence involved in AAD isn’t
properly understood as causal.6 If entanglement-related AAD isn’t causal, then
timelike entanglement doesn’t imply retrocausation.
Second, even if we grant that retrocausation is involved, there is no reason
to think that this is untenable. While there may be some accounts of causation
that preclude retrocausation, many accept at least its conceptual possibility.
There are, of course, well-known paradoxes associated with retrocausation—the
grandfather paradox and its ilk—but there is reason to doubt their relevance
here. As noted above, the no-signalling theorems severely constrain the uses
of AAD, should it exist. For instance, one cannot use entanglement-related
influence to send signals, or transfer energy or some other conserved quantity.
5As noted above, in the experiment of Ma et al. (2012), the “choice” to perform a BSM
was made by a random number generator. Thus, the worry there would be whether the device
was truly random, but the considerations on both sides would be similar.
6On the popular interventionist approach to causation, for instance, a necessary condition
on a variable being a cause is that certain inventions on it reliably lead to changes in the effect
(Woodward, 2005). But, the impossibility of signalling suggests that the relevant interventions
aren’t possible in quantum theory, and hence, that this condition isn’t met in the case of AAD.
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It’s hard to see how one could generate an instance of the grandfather paradox
without relying on a variety of retrocausation of a stronger form than the no-
signalling theorems will permit.
If, however, it were possible to generate a paradox using entanglement-
related retrocausation, then AAD would already be in trouble in the ordinary
spacelike case. Causal paradoxes result when we have inconsistent events in a
causal loop (e.g., killing one’s grandfather and being born). But now suppose
that we have a causal loop involving spacelike events A and B (say, Alice and
Bob’s measurement results, respectively). One could then introduce an incon-
sistency in the loop, for example: A causes B and B causes ¬A, resulting in
a paradox. The upshot is that AAD advocates must place certain restrictions
on entanglement-related causation for independent reasons, and these restric-
tions ensure that retrocausality will not lead to paradoxes (cf., Price & Wharton
(2015)).
2.2. Timelike NS
The NS strategy seeks to understand entanglement by treating entangled
particles as something like “fragments of a more fundamental whole.” There
are several ways of cashing out such a metaphor. Entangled particles may be
viewed as: aspects of an extended/multiply-located/scattered simple, parts that
are less fundamental than the whole they compose, low-dimensional projections
of single object located in a high-dimensional space, etc.. What these strategies
all have in common is a rejection of the fundamental distinctness of entangled
particles. This enables the NS proponent to give a “common ground” expla-
nation of non-local behavior along the lines of common cause explanation, but
based in non-causal grounding relations (Ismael & Schaffer, 2016). In a word,
spacelike correlations are unsurprising if they concern measurements of the same
thing.
Our concern here is not with the details of versions of NS, but rather, whether
it can sustain timelike entanglement. And there answer seems to be clearly, yes,
it can. First, note that objects can be extended discontinuously (or scattered,
multiply-located, etc.) in time as well as in space. A single performance of a
play, for instance, exists both before and after intermission, but not in between.
Second, on Schaffer’s (2010) view, entanglement motivates not just holism, but
priority monism, in which there is a single fundamental object—the Cosmos—
in which everything is grounded. But surely the Cosmos is unlimited in both
spatial and temporal extent. Third, if NS is meant to apply to real experimental
implementations of EPR scenarios, then some measure of temporal extension
is needed. In any actual EPR experiment, Alice’s and Bob’s measurements
will often be non-simultaneous (either because there is no preferred foliation, or
because they fail to be perfectly simultaneous on the preferred foliation), so if
the explanation of the correlations in their measurement data proceeds via NS,
it seems that the fundamental whole must include both Alice’s particle at MA
and Bob’s particle at MB , where MA 6= MB .
DCES does, however, have important implications for the NS strategy. The
natural way to understand NS on a collapse interpretation involves thinking of
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an entangled system (1,2) as being disentangled (and the corresponding whole
thereby destroyed) upon measurement of either of the particles it contains (1
or 2). However, if NS is to account for DCES, then this cannot occur. It is
essential that the entangled pairs (1,2) and (3,4) are wholly present when Victor
performs his BSM at MV > MA,MB . This would suggest a tension with the NS
strategy and collapse interpretations, which would seem to imply that Alice and
Bob measurements disentangle (and thereby destroy) the wholes before Victor
performs his measurement. Thus, it seems that NS cannot account for DCES if
combined with a collapse interpretation of this form.7
Thus, it seems that for these two approaches, timelike entanglement implies
a revision rather than a rejection of entanglement realism. Of course, challenges
remain for making sense of timelike entanglement, but these have more to do
with the details of AAD and NS rather than timelike entanglement as such. For
example, one might worry that the application of timelike entanglement to this
case makes entanglement trivial.8 In order to explain Bell-type correlations in
the measurement results of Alice and Bob, the proponent of timelike entangle-
ment claims that there is an entanglement relation between (1,4) at the time of
Alice’s and Bob’s measurement due to Victor’s later BSM. This is motivated by
the idea that equation 2 doesn’t depend on the time-order of the measurements.
However, that means that we could also argue that (2,3) are entangled before
Victor’s BSM via the same equation. But then it would seem to follow that
any particles could be considered entangled because they could be subject to a
BSM in the future. This would render entanglement relations trivial, and hence,
incapable of explaining Bell-type correlations.
As noted above, it’s open to the advocate of timelike AAD to suppose that
the earlier entanglement of (1,4) causes the later BSM and entanglement of
(2,3). But, a more plausible approach would be to claim that while equation
2 is neutral with respect to the dependencies involved, there is reason to think
Victor’s BSM is responsible for the entanglement of (1,4). On this view, (1,4)
are entangled at MA,MB in virtue of Victor’s later measurement (at MV ).
Generalizing, a pair of particles in a DCES experiment are entangled only if there
actually is a BSM performed in the future that swaps entanglement to them.
Of course, one may not know whether such a measurement will be performed,
and hence, may wish to leave it open that the particles one encounters may
be entangled. But, this doesn’t trivialize entanglement as it still only applies
to certain pairs of particles, namely, those prepared in an entangled state or
entangled via swapping. Such an account may be developed in either realist
approach discussed. On AAD, Victor’s measurement has a retrocausal (or non-
causal influence) on the pair of particles (1,4) at t ≤MA,MB . On NS, Victor’s
measurement gives rise to the (1,4) whole that Alice and Bob both measure.
7Indeed, there are difficult questions involving measurement and dynamical evolution on
any version of NS. When exactly do the entangled wholes in question exist and how are they
created and destroyed? These challenges are compounded by the requirement of Lorentz
invariance in special relativity (cf., Myrvold (2002a)).
8Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
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There are difficulties in working out the details and timing of such processes
but, I submit, these difficulties are by in large the same as those already faced
by these approaches in the context of spacelike entanglement.
3. Alternative 1: Anti-realism
I’ve argued that one can allow for timelike entanglement without inviting
paradox, but one may still feel that the revisionary metaphysics required to
do so motivates consideration of a more deflationary approach. For those who
adopt an epistemic (or non-ontic) understanding of the quantum state, ascribing
a quantum state to a compound system never merits positing a physical entan-
glement relation among the subsystems. Rather, the quantum state functions
as a “catalogue of our knowledge” useful for making predictions about future
measurement outcomes, but not descriptive of reality in any straightforward
manner.
On such a view, DCES presents no puzzles (apparent or otherwise). Alice,
Bob, and Victor each have their own quantum state assignments. Based on
the initial preparation, they may all start off ascribing the quantum state |Ψ〉 =
|ψ−〉12⊗|ψ−〉34. Alice, upon making her measurement of particle 1, updates her
quantum state for the entire 4-particle system on the basis of her measurement
result in accordance with Lu¨der’s rule, and likewise for Bob. Victor, assuming
he doesn’t (or cannot) know Alice and Bob’s results, also begins with |Ψ〉 and
then updates accordingly. Thus, if Victor performs a BSM, then he will assign
to particles (1, 4) an entangled state, but this means only that he will expect to
find measurement results consistent with this state when he learns of Alice and
Bob’s results. Crucially, Victor’s ascribing an entangled state to particles (1, 4)
doesn’t imply any physical entanglement relation between them at MA,MB (or
any other time), but rather, merely guides his credences about the measurement
results obtained by Alice and Bob.
This is a coherent picture, and it succeeds in avoiding revisionary meta-
physics, but it does so at a cost. In particular, it inherits the traditional prob-
lems of antirealisms: a lack of explanatory power and a failure to take the theory
at face value. First, if one abandons the representational role of the quantum
state, then they cannot provide explanations of phenomena in terms of the
world it describes. In the case of entanglement, non-ontic views are incapable
of explaining non-local phenomena (i.e., measurement results that violate a Bell
inequality) by appeal to a physical entanglement relation. Of course, certain ex-
planations are still available: one can note that the initial quantum state |Ψ〉 pre-
dicts certain non-local phenomena, and hence, one should expect to find them.
But such explanations are little comfort for those who seek to know what it is
about the world that accounts for the Bell-type correlations in Alice and Bob’s
measurement results. Second, there is a general worry that this story is a poor
fit with what quantum theory seems to be telling us. After all, nearly all mature
physical theories use mathematical objects to represent states—conditions of a
physical object—and apply a dynamical evolution to these states to generate
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empirical predictions. When these predictions are borne out, it is extremely nat-
ural to regard the states and dynamics involved as descriptive of an underlying
reality.
As noted, these are standard problems for antirealisms in a variety of con-
texts and are unlikely to move either advocates or critics of this alternative. I
mention them here to emphasize the following: DCES changes little with re-
spect to the considerations for or against realism about entanglement. If one is
weary of revisionary metaphysics, then they will have given up on physical en-
tanglement well before consideration of these experiments. And if one is happy
to take metaphysical lessons from quantum theory, then DCES is a source of
new insights rather than a paradox in need of resolution. As I’ve sketched in
section 2, it is unlikely that DCES will result in an outright contradiction for
any worked-out understanding of entanglement. In sum, if one is willing and
able to incorporate spacelike entanglement into their picture of reality, there is
no clear reason why timelike entanglement should lead them to abandon the
realist endeavor.
4. Alternative 2: Limited Realism
An alternative interpretation of DCES is given by Egg (2013). Egg en-
deavours to provide a principled basis to accept the realist account of ordinary
entanglement swapping but reject its extension to DCES. Egg’s reply focuses
on an aspect of Ma et al.’s DCES experiment that was omitted from the ini-
tial presentation. Unlike a simple EPR experiment, the correlations in the data
recorded by Alice and Bob are only apparent once that data has been sorted into
subensembles according to the measurement performed and results obtained by
Victor. Once we sort the results obtained by Alice and Bob in this way, we find
that the subsets of data associated with Victor performing a BSM exhibit corre-
lations that violate a Bell inequality. This leads Egg to conclude the following:
The Bell measurement on the [2,3] pair allows us to sort the [1,4]
pairs into four subensembles corresponding to the four Bell states.
Without delayed choice, this has physical significance, because each
[1,4] pair really is in such a state after the [2,3] measurement. But
if the [1,4] measurements precede the [2,3] measurement, the [1,4]
pair never is in any of these states. This is entirely compatible
with the fact that evaluating the [1,4] measurements within a certain
subensemble shows Bell-type correlations. (Egg, 2013, 1133, original
emphasis)
Egg’s proposal is that we should posit physical entanglement between (1,4)
only when Victor’s measurement occurs before Alice’s and Bob’s (MV < MA,MB).
This allows one to preserve realism about entanglement (and an ontic view of the
quantum state more generally) without having to adopt the revisionary meta-
physics outlined in section 2. However, there are at least two problems with the
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proposal: (a) it’s hard to reconcile with special relativity, (b) it leave us unable
to explain the correlations in Alice and Bob’s results in a DCES experiment.
First, as Healey (2017) notes, it’s unclear how to apply Egg’s account to cases
of spacelike entanglement swapping—i.e., when MV is spacelike to MA,MB .
Consideration of such cases isn’t purely of philosophical interest either, as ex-
periments such as Hensen et al. (2015) utilize spacelike swapping to prepare
entangled particles. There are two main avenues of response: (a) posit a pre-
ferred foliation or (b) relativize to a frame. Egg seems to have some sympathies
for (a) as he notes that “[s]ome of the most widely discussed realistic versions
of quantum theory (e.g., Bohmian mechanics and the matter-density version
of GRW) involve a commitment to a preferred foliation of spacetime. If these
proposals are reasonable, then so is the assumption that there is a definite (al-
though undetectable) temporal ordering between any two events” (Egg, 2013,
1130, fn.7). But, of course, not all realists are comfortable with such an as-
sumption in clear tension with special relativity. If DCES compelled realists to
adopt a preferred foliation, I suspect that many would defect to the antirealist
camp. That leaves option (b), in which whether (1,4) become entangled is a
frame-dependent manner (cf., Myrvold (2002b)). This is also a difficult position
for realists to adopt. It is standardly assumed that matters of (fundamental)
ontology should be invariant under changes of reference frame, but this view
would require one to hold both that (a) entanglement is physically real and
(b) whether entanglement obtains is frame-dependent. Thus, adopting this ver-
sion of Egg’s proposal would lead to substantial challenges for the entanglement
realist in the context of spacelike swapping.
Putting this to one side, there is further difficulty with Egg’s limited realism.
Just as the antirealist is unable to explain non-local phenomena, Egg’s proposal
leaves one unable to account for the Bell-type correlations between Alice and
Bob’s measurement results in a case of DCES. As Egg notes, it “entirely com-
patible” with a lack of genuine entanglement that measurement results involving
(1,4) are correlated within a subensemble, but that is not to say the correla-
tion has been explained. After all, the correlations here are strong enough to
violate a Bell inequality, which is not at all unsurprising even given sorting.
At a minimum, Egg owes us an explanation of why we should expect to find
Bell-type correlations in this case. Moreover, Egg cannot appeal to the simple
explanation given in the ordinary swapping case based on equation 2 as that
equation no longer applies at MV on his proposal. In fact, this proposal must
account for why that explanation is inappropriate in the delayed-choice case
despite the fact that it doesn’t depend on the time-order of the measurements
(which all commute with one another). Thus, on Egg’s proposal, one can ac-
count for violations of Bell inequalities in DCES neither by appeal to a physical
entanglement relation, nor by appeal to Lu¨der’s updating applied to equation 2.
This is perhaps unsurprising given that the position is antirealist about entan-
glement in the context of DCES, but it urges us to consider whether the costs
of timelike entanglement warrant a retreat to a position that realists fight hard
to resist in ordinary cases of entanglement.
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5. Formalizing Timelike Entanglement
I’ve argued that timelike entanglement allows for an explanatory and con-
ceptually coherent interpretation of DCES. Given the costs associated with the
alternatives, one may do well to take the implications of DCES at face value
and seek to incorporate timelike entanglement into our understanding of the
quantum world. There is, however, an important lacuna in the discussion thus
far, namely: there seems to be no way to represent timelike entanglement in
the standard formalism of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In ordinary
quantum mechanics, the state of system 1 at a time corresponds to a density
operator ρ1 in the Hilbert spaceH1 for the system. The state of a composite sys-
tem is represented by a density operator ρ12 in the tensor-project Hilbert space
H12 = H1 ⊗H2. Again, it is assumed that ρ12 corresponds to the joint state of
(1,2) at a single time (regardless of whether 1 and 2 are spatially separated or
degrees of freedom of a single physical object). Thus, timelike entanglement ap-
pears to require some new way of composing composite states from the standard
tensor-product formalism; one that will allow for trans-temporal composition.
Now, there have been some attempts to find a contruction for the represen-
tation of states across time. For example, Fitzsimons et al. (2015) aim to treat
correlations in the results of measurements carried out at different times in the
same manner as those between measurements performed at spacelike separation.
They propose using a pseudo-density operator composed of the measurement
results in question, which reduces to an ordinary density operator when the
measurements are spacelike. Interestingly, the authors use this construction
to identify correlations indicative of causal relations, not entanglement. But,
as they note, their measure of “causality” is nearly identical to measures of
entanglement, so the difference may not be so great.9
However, Horsman et al. (2017) prove a no-go theorem that rules out the
possibility of quantum states across time—including the proposal of Fitzsimons
et al.—given a number of physically plausible criteria. This would seem to show
that “there is something fundamentally misguided in attempting to treat quan-
tum systems over time in the same manner as composite systems at a single
time” (Horsman et al., 2017, 12). Yet, as the authors themselves emphasize,
their theorem is only as powerful as its axioms, and hence, one may alterna-
tively conclude that representing states across time requires relaxing some of
the standard assumptions about compound quantum states. Indeed, this seems
to be precisely what we would expect in trying to develop a new conception of
quantum states applicable to collections of systems at different times.
For our purposes, it suffices to point out that this is an area of on-going
research. Clearly some revision to the usual quantum formalism is required to
9Leifer & Spekkens (2013) is another attempt. Their aim is to support the analogy with
classical probability theory in which conditional probabilities may be defined for events bearing
any spatiotemporal relation. If compound quantum states can been made similarly indepen-
dent of time, then perhaps they are really just classical probability distributions after all, as
the Bayesian approach to quantum theory claims.
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make sense timelike entanglement, but further work is needed to see the best
way to proceed. My aim in this paper has been to provide some motivation
for a notion of timelike entanglement in DCES experiments, however the best
way to express it formally may be. If it were clear that there is no construction
capable of representing timelike entanglement, then the point would be moot,
but the no-go theorem of Horsman et al. (2017) fails to establish anything as
strong as this.
6. Conclusion
I’ve argued that timelike entanglement—understood in a realist manner—
provides a clear understanding of DCES. Given the difficulty of characterizing
timelike entanglement in the standard quantum formalism, this may recommend
modifying quantum theory in some manner. A similar conclusion is reached
by Emily Adlam in a recent paper (Adlam, 2018). Adlam challenges the as-
sumption of temporal locality in quantum theory—that is, “ the assumption
that the probabilities attached to the outcomes of a measurement performed
at a given time depend only on the state of the world at that time” (Adlam,
2018, 1). Among the motivations for Adlam’s challenge is entanglement in
time, which she discusses in the context of the so-called “temporal Bell inequal-
ities.” The best-known of these is the Leggett-Garg inequality (Leggett & Garg,
1985), which follows from the assumption of “macrorealism” and is violated by
quantum theory. However, despite its formal similarity to Bell’s inequality, the
assumptions required to derive the Leggett-Garg inequality are far more con-
troversial than those assumed by Bell, making it unclear just what it shows
(Timpson & Maroney, 2013). Similar remarks apply to the inequality derived
by Brukner et al. (2004), which purports to demonstrate entanglement in time,
but requires a strong assumption about the nature of quantum measurements.
However, there are still other variations of temporal Bell inequalities, and some
of these may involve more plausible assumptions. If so, these results could pro-
vide additional motivation for entanglement across time from those discussed
here.
Regardless of the fate of the temporal Bell inequality program, DCES pro-
vides another reason to take timelike entanglement, and hence temporal non-
locality, seriously. Indeed, one may share Adlam’s ambition that timelike entan-
glement “may ultimately point us not just to a new interpretation of quantum
mechanics but to a new theory altogether” (Adlam, 2018, 17).
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